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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY: RELIC RE-
VISED TO EXCLUDE EXPECTATION DAMAGES-Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wn.
2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977).
Plaintiff, relying on defendant's proposal of marriage, trained a re-
placement for her job, placed her home for sale, sold her furniture,
and incurred normal expenses incidental to a future union.' One
month before the date of marriage, defendant informed plaintiff he
would not fulfill his promise of marriage; she subsequently became ill,
repurchased her home furnishings, and cancelled all wedding plans.
Plaintiff brought suit for breach of promise to marry,2 seeking dam-
ages for (1) direct pecuniary losses; (2) pain, impairment to health,
humiliation, embarrassment; and (3) loss of the expected financial se-
curity of marriage. 3 The superior court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 4 In a seven
to two decision, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded for trial, modifying the remedy of the cause of action to ex-
clude damages for loss of future financial security.5 Stanard v. Bolin,
88 Wn. 2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977).
Breach of promise to marry is a common law action that originated
in an era in which the contractual exchange of mutual promises to
marry was the product of serious family negotiations concerning the
1. Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wn. 2d 614, 616, 565 P.2d 94, 95 (1977).
2. For a discussion of breach of promise to marry, see H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RE-
LAnONS §§ 1.1-.9 (1968); Brockelbank, The Nature of the Promise to Marry-A
Study in Comparative Law (pts. I-II), 41 ILL. L. REV. 1, 199 (1946).
3. Brief for Appellant at 2, Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wn. 2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977).
Such damages are traditional in breach of promise suits. See C. MCCORMICK ON DAM-
AGES § 111 (1935). Expectation damages for loss of financial security of marriage are
intended to place the plaintiff in the same position as if the marriage contract had been
performed. See id. § 111, at 399-400.
4. Stanard v. Bolin, No. 229654 (Wash. Super. Ct., Spokane County, Mar. 17,
1976) (memorandum decision on motion to dismiss). The trial judge found the com-
mon law action of breach of promise incompatible with contemporary conditions,
noting the following considerations: (1) the modern conception of an engagement as
a trial period rather than a binding contract; (2) disregard of fault in the 1973 Wash-
ington Dissolution of Marriage Act; and (3) the action's potential for abuse. Id. at
4-5.
5. There seems to be no other court which has modified damages for breach of
promise to marry in this fashion. See Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 553, 561-66 (1960) (gen-
eral rule permits expectation damages in breach of promise suits).
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financial implications of the union. 6 Consistent with this emphasis on
the property and bargaining aspects of the contract to marry, courts
had awarded damages for breach of an engagement based upon loss
of the bargain-the expected financial value of the marriage. 7 With
property concerns largely incidental to the modern marriage forma-
tion, the outmoded justification for such damages has come under at-
tack.8 Changes in the perception of marriage as well as extensive criti-
cism concerning abuses of breach of promise suits9 have prompted
legislatures in eighteen states to modify or abolish the cause of action
by enacting "anti-heartbalm statutes." 10
This note contends that the Stanard court's elimination of one ele-
ment of damages fails adequately to redress abuses inherent in breach
of promise actions. It also argues that this archaic method of compen-
sation for a broken engagement'1 should be legislatively eliminated.1 2
After examining Stanard and developing an alternative rationale
available to the court, this note will discuss such remedial legislation.
I. REASONING OF THE STANARD COURT
Because the cause of action for breach of promise to marry origi-
nated in common law and has not been addressed by the Washington
legislature, the Stanard court had the power to test the "continued via-
6. The contractual basis of breach of promise to marry is to be distinguished from
the common law tort actions of alienation of affections (wrongful interference with
the marital relationship), see, e.g., Swearingen v. Vik, 51 Wn. 2d 843, 322 P.2d 876
(1958); criminal conversation (adultery), see, e.g., Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn. 2d
412, 213 P.2d 627 (1950); and seduction (enticement to have sexual intercourse).
see, e.g., Opitz v. Hayden, 17 Wn. 2d 347, 135 P.2d 819 (1943).
7. See, e.g., Bundy v. Dickinson, 108 Wash. 52, 182 P. 947 (1919).
8. See, e.g., H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1.1 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MicH. L. REV.
979 (1935); Wright, The Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise, 10 VA. L. REV.
361 (1924).
10. See Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wn. 2d at 618 n.1, 565 P.2d at 96 n.1, for a listing
of the statutes. The term "anti-heartbalm" describes legislation countering the use of
breach of promise suits to soothe the aching heart of the aggrieved party. If a statute
specifically abolishes actions on breach of promise, it is generally held to likewise bar
suits to recover damages for fraudulent promises to marry. See note 45 and accom-
panying text infra.
11. Prior to Stanard, the most recent breach of promise to marry suit to reach the
Washington Supreme Court was Armitage v. Hogan, 25 Wn. 2d 672, 171 P.2d 830
(1946) (action sought only the return of money and gifts given).
12. No court has abolished this cause of action, but the Stanard court indicated it
had the power to do so. See note 13 and accompanying text infra.
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Promise to Marry
bility in the light of present-day society" of the cause of action. 13 The
court identified five criticisms of the cause of action: 14 (1) it can be
used for blackmail; 15 (2) it can unduly inhibit what is meant to be a
trial period; 16 (3) it is particularly subject to abuse by sympathetic ju-
ries; 17 (4) it is essentially tortious and penal in nature but allowed un-
der the guise of a contract action; 18 (5) damage awards unjustly al-
low recovery for loss of expected economic and social position.' 9
The majority opinion dismissed the first three criticisms as
13. 88 Wn. 2d at 617, 565 P.2d at 96. In support of this proposition, the court
cited Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972) (interspousal immunity);
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wn. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953)
(charitable hospital immunity); and Wyman v. Wallace, 15 Wn. App. 395, 549 P.2d
71 (1976), petition for review granted, 88 Wn. 2d 1010 (1977) (alienation of affec-
tions).
14. 88 Wn. 2d at 618, 565 P.2d at 96.
15. The threat of bringing suit to coerce an out-of-court settlement from an inno-
cent party might be the greatest abuse of the action. See Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 390
Pa. 502, 136 A.2d 127, 130 (1957) ("not unusual in threatened breach of promise
suits that the defendant preferred to buy his peace through a monetary settlement
rather than be vindicated by a trial which might leave his good name in shreds").
The potential for blackmail is enhanced by the relative ease of establishing the marital
agreement. Mutual promises to marry are specifically exempted from the statute of
frauds, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.36.010(3) (1976), and the contract is often implied
from circumstantial evidence, H. CLARK, DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 1.2 (1968); Brown,
Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 474, 477-78 (1929); L. Rieke, Domestic
Relations Cases and Materials, 1-2 (rev. ed. 1964) (unpublished casebook in Univer-
sity of Washington law library). See generally Kelly v. Drumheller, 150 Wash. 185,
272 P. 731 (1928).
16. Existence of the cause of action lessens the functional utility of the engage-
ment. For example, the detection of conflicting personalities will not relieve a reneg-
ing engaged party from potential liability, absent mutual rescission. See Brockelbank,
Tile Nature of the Promise to Marry-A Study in Comparative Law (pts. I-II), 41
ILL. L. REV. I at 9-10, 199 at 202-03 (1946).
17. There is wide jury discretion in assessing the damages for such amorphous
injuries as humiliation. See Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MicH.
L. REV. 979, 983 (1935). Even in jurisdictions where punitive damages are forbidden
(such as Washington, Conrad v. Lakewood General Hosp., 67 Wn. 2d 934, 410 P.2d
785 (1966)), an exemplary award might be made under the recognized damage cate-
gories of embarrassment or humiliation. In breach of promise suits, the defendant's
wealth "usually has a more potent effect upon the size of the verdict than any doc-
trinal instruction about damages." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § I 1l, at 399.
18. Although acknowledging its contractual basis, many authorities characterize
the cause of action as essentially ex delicto in nature because of the difference in
treatment between marital promises and other contracts regarding survival of the ac-
tion, mitigation of damages, the statute of frauds, the bargaining nature, defenses,
and the particular damages recoverable (i.e., pain, humiliation, punitive damages).
See, e.g., Brown, Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 474, 474-90 (1929);
Wright, The Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise, 10 VA. L. REV. 361, 370-75
(1924). This may explain the Stanard court's characterization of the cause of action
as "quasi-contract, quasi-tort." 88 Wn. 2d at 622, 565 P.2d at 98.
19. This argument reflects the evolution of societal and legal attitudes toward
economic motivations to marry. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
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insufficient to justify abolishing the action.20 In an attempt to recon-
cile the conflicting contract and tort theories behind breach of prom-
ise suits, the Stanard court simply classified the action as "quasi-con-
tract, quasi-tort."21 The court accepted the final argument, objecting
to compensation for loss of expected financial advantage, but only to
the extent of limiting recoverable damages. The court reasoned that
because the primary motivation to marry is love rather than financial
gain, nonexistent economic expectations should not be recoverable. 22
In its decision to retain the modified cause of action, the court was
guided by an overriding concern that a deserving plaintiff should be
provided legal protection as long as objections to the cause of action
could be minimized. 23
II. AN ALTERNATIVE REASONING PROCESS
Although the Stanard court's "quasi-contract, quasi-tort" treatment
of breach of promise actions can be reconciled with the characteriza-
tion of several commentators,24 a better analysis would rely exclu-
sively on contract theory. The double "quasi" labeling of the action
creates confusion because "quasi-contract" is improperly used, 25 and
because the label is an unnecessary mixing of contract and tort law.
20. Concerning the potential for coercion, the court found it difficult to envision a
defendant who would rather marry than pay for the injuries caused by her breach, or
a plaintiff who would bring suit to force an unstable marriage. 88 Wn. 2d at 621-22.
565 P.2d at 98. Although the state should not encourage doubtful marriages, the court
believed parties should not be free to end an engagement without liability for poten-
tial injuries. Id. at 621. 565 P.2d at 98. The court dismissed the jury abuse argument
because it placed too little faith in the objectivity of the jury and courts. Id. at 620-
21, 565 P.2d at 97.
21. Id. at 617- 18, 622, 565 P.2d at 96, 98. See also note 18 supra.
22. 88 Wn. 2d at 619-20, 565 P.2d at 97. Although economic advancement may
be an incident of the marriage (whether expected or not), the elimination of this
damage element is desirable because it lessens the potential for blackmail and makes
consideration of the defendant's wealth irrelevant, thus decreasing the danger of sym-
pathetic jury awards.
23. Justice Utter, joined by Justice Dolliver, dissented. They found sufficient author-
ity to abolish the action in the policies announced by the court of appeals in Wyman
v. Wallace, 15 Wn. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976), petition for review granted, 88
Wn. 2d 1010 (1977); the legislative intent behind Washington's Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act; and the criticisms listed by the Stanard majority. 88 Wn. 2d at 622-24,
565 P.2d at 98-99. See Part IlI-A infra.
24. See note 18 supra.
25. Quasi-contract is a misnomer in this context because the contract to marry is
not implied in law for reasons of justice, as the term is commonly defined, see A. COR-




Injuries could be adequately compensated under consequential and
reliance contract damages. This analysis would be more consistent
with the contractual basis of the cause of action-the exchange of
mutual promises to marry.26 In addition, the jury's appraisal of dam-
ages in a contract case is subject to greater judicial scrutiny than in a
tort suit.27 This closer supervision would help quell the criticism of
excessive jury awards in breach of promise suits.2 8
A strictly contractual approach can adequately compensate a
breach of promise plaintiff. Personal injuries in breach of promise ac-
tions, such as humiliation or loss of health, have traditionally been
compensable under principles of tort law2 9 despite the contractual ba-
sis of the action. Contractual analysis need not foreclose such dam-
ages, because humiliation or loss of sleep can reasonably be contem-
plated as consequential damages flowing from a refusal to fulfill a
promise to marry.30 Indeed, the foreseeability of such consequential
26. Treatment of breach of promise suits under contract law would also be com-
patible with the characterization of marriage as contractual. See Rieke, The Dissolu-
tion Act of1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV. 375 (1974).
27. Courts reviewing the appropriateness of damage awards are more deferential
toward the jury's determination in tort cases than in contract cases. A tort damage
award will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is the result of passion or prejudice
on the part of the jury, or if the amount of the award shocks the sense of justice of
the appellate court. See, e.g., Hogenson v. Service Armament Co., 77 Wn. 2d 209,
217-18, 461 P.2d 311, 316 (1969); Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc., 43
Wn. 2d 386, 395-96, 261 P.2d 692, 697-98 (1953). This has also been the review
standard in breach of promise suits in Washington. Bundy v. Dickinson, 108 Wash.
52, 56, 182 P. 947, 949 (1919). A consequential damage award in a contract action,
which would include emotional and physical harm in a breach of promise suit, will
be upheld if it was both reasonably foreseeable, Wilkins v. Grays Harbor Com. Hosp.,
71 Wn. 2d 178, 186, 427 P.2d 716, 721 (1967), and supported by sufficient evidence
to afford a reasonable basis for estimating the damage, Prier v. Refrigeration Eng'r
Co., 74 Wn. 2d 25, 31, 442 P.2d 621, 625 (1968). Professor McCormick stated that
in actions for breach of contract, as opposed to tort, "legal rules furnish standards of
compensation which can be applied with more definiteness, and the trial judge can
properly require a closer conformity in the verdict to his own belief as to the proper
amount to be arrived at from an application of the standard to the facts." C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 3, § 18, at 72.
28. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
29. See Rieger v. Abrams, 98 Wash. 72, 77, 167 P. 76, 78 (1917) (damages in
breach of promise actions are governed by principles which apply to actions for per-
sonal torts).
30. As a general rule, damages for mental suffering are not allowable in actions
for breach of contract, but an exception has been recognized when the benefit con-
tracted for is a nonpecuniary interest. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 145. When
the subject matter of a contract directly affects the feelings, happiness, or personal
welfare of one of the parties, recovery may be had for mental suffering proximately
caused by its breach. Id. The exception is narrowly construed, but its rationale does
include breach of promise to marry, even under a contractual treatment of damages.
Id.; S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1341 (3d ed. 1968).
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damages is heightened by the emotions and intimacies of the sur-
rounding circumstances. Generally, expenses incurred in preparing to
perform a contract are recoverable as damages for its breach. 31 Wed-
ding expenses subsequent to the exchange of mutual promises to
marry clearly fall within this category of reliance damages. Since the
injuries which concerned the Stanard majority are fully compensable
by recovering consequential and reliance contract damages, no ad-
vantage can be derived from the use of the "quasi-contract, quasi-
tort" classification.
The Stanard court recognized both the existence of reliance dam-
ages and the foreseeability of certain personal injuries, 32 yet failed to
confine the cause of action to contract law. Nevertheless, continued
retention of breach of promise, even under the alternative contractual
analysis, preserves the blackmail potential and inhibits the engage-
ment trial period. A legislative remedy is preferable to this outmoded
cause of action.
III. ABOLISHING BREACH OF PROMISE ACTIONS
A. Modern Domestic Relations Policy
In 1973, Washington's domestic relations policy underwent a dra-
matic change with the adoption of the "no-fault" Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act.33 In contrast to the adversarial framework of the prior
divorce statute,34 the present act attempts to establish ground rules
whereby the parties can dispense with accusations and part amica-
31. See, e.g., Lloyd v. American Can Co., 128 Wash. 298, 222 P. 876 (1924).
cited with approval in Paduano v. Boespflug Constr. Co.. 66 Wn. 2d 527, 532, 403
P.2d 841, 845 (1965) ("It is well established that actual expenditures to the date of a
breach of contract are compensable in damages.").
32. 88 Wn. 2d at 619, 565 P.2d at 96-97.
33. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.09 (1976). The Stanard majority failed to consider
the general policy implications behind this Act, an omission fatal to an internally
consistent body of domestic relations law. Both the dissent and the trial judge properly
considered the dissolution act. See 88 Wn. 2d at 623, 565 P.2d at 98-99 (Utter, J..
dissenting), Stanard v. Bolin, No. 229654 at 4-5 (Wash. Super. Ct., Spokane County.
Mar. 17, 1976) (memorandum decision on motion to dismiss).
34. Divorce Act of 1949, 1949 Wash. Laws. ch. 215 (repealed 1973). See Rieke.
supra note 26, at 387-88.
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bly.35 Legislative recognition of the inherent problems of the "fault"
system and the consequent adoption of the dissolution act indicate a
preference for private resolution rather than state intervention in the
area of domestic relations.3 6
The legislative "hands off" policy towards dissolution of the mari-
tal relationship would seem broad enough to encompass the forma-
tion process. It would be anomalous to prompt a reluctant party to
perform an unconsidered promise to marry through the threat of a
civil suit for failure to consummate that promise, and then to offer a
lenient statutory escape through the dissolution act.3 7 It is incongru-
ous to award fault-based damages following a broken engagement
when they have been specifically eliminated from dissolutions of mar-
riage.38 A rational system would extend the preference for private so-
lutions exemplified in the dissolution act to the breach of promise situ-
ation.
Another recent expression of the policy of nonintervention in the
area of marital relations is provided in Wyman v. Wallace,39 a pro-
gressive 1976 decision of the Washington Court of Appeals. 40 The
35. Rieke, supra note 26, at 378. The fault determination under the old statute re-
gulated the ability to obtain a divorce as well as ancillary relief. By stressing compensa-
tion rather than penalization under the new dissolution act, the possiblilty of
reconciliation is no longer hindered by an accusatory process. See Holman, A Law in
the Spirit of Conciliation and Understanding: Washington's Marriage Dissolution Act,
9 GoNz. L. REv. 39, 39 (1973).
36. See Rieke, supra note 26, at 394-99. In effect, the marriage is terminable at
will because the mere allegation by one party that the marriage is "irretrievably
broken" is sufficient to grant dissolution under the Washington Act. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.09.030 (1976). When a private solution cannot be reached, the disposition of
property is determined upon consideration of the nature and extent of community
and separate property, the duration of marriage, and the economic circumstances of
each spouse rather than upon a basis of fault. Id. § 26.09.080. Under the Act, main-
tenance orders are also granted "without regard to marital misconduct." Id. § 26.09.090
(1). See also Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Mar-
riage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663, 665 (1976).
37. Marital turnover is hardly desirable, but theoretically could be promoted by
the existing law. For example, two days before the marriage ceremony, X decides not
to marry Z, and is concerned about financial repercussions. Conceivably, the least
costly route would be to perform the marriage, then immediately initiate dissolution
proceedings. The cost might include a maintenance award mutually agreed upon or
judicially determined. In light of the short duration of the marriage, however, a small
award would be likely. Benefits of this tactic would include avoiding a breach of prom-
ise suit and its potential abuses (e.g., embarrassing trial, coerced out-of-court settle-
ment, and large jury award).
38. See note 36 supra.
39. 15 Wn. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976), petition for review granted, 88 Wn. 2d
1010 (1977).
40. The Wyman court's action contrasts with that of other courts which have al-
lowed the legislature to determine whether to abolish actions for alienation of affec-
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court concluded that the common law tort action of alienation of
spousal affections should be abolished, basing its decision on essen-
tially the same criticisms identified by the Stanard majority. 41 The
continuing precedential value of Wyman is questionable because, im-
mediately prior to the Stanard decision, the Washington Supreme
Court granted a petition to review. 42 A reversal of Wyman would rep-
resent further judicial divergence from Washington's "hands off" do-
mestic relations policy concerning marital matters and accentuate
even more the need for remedial legislation. 43
B. Considerations in Drafting an Anti-Heartbalm Statute
Adoption of an anti-heartbalm statute in Washington would re-
move this coercive and penal cause of action,44 but such a statute
tion. See Comment, Alienation of Affections: Flourishing Anachronism, 13 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 585, 593-96 (1977); 12 GONZ. L. REV. 545 (1977). The Wyman de-
cision was limited to the action for alienation of the affections of a spouse by an un-
related third party. "It [did] not abolish actions for the alienation of the affections
of a child." 15 Wn. App. at 400 n.4, 549 P.2d at 74 n.4.
41. Criticisms found persuasive included (1) the judicially created action is in-
compatible with present day society, (2) the action is in the nature of legalized black-
mail, (3) the damages are essentially penal in nature, (4) the measurement of dam-
ages is uncertain, and (5) the interests the action seeks to protect are outweighed by
the harm it engenders. 15 Wn. App. at 397-401, 549 P.2d at 72-74. Cf. notes 14-19
and accompanying text supra (criticisms identified in Stanard). The Wyman court
applied a standard of review of a common law action which the Stanard court also
adopted. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
42. 88 Wn. 2d 1010 (1977). Because marriage involves a deeper personal com-
mitment than an engagement, the societal concern to compensate and protect would
presumably be greater in the marital action for alienation of affection. Thus, the re-
fusal to abolish breach of promise to marry in Stanard indicates a probable supreme
court reversal of Wyman. However, an affirmance of Wyman is not foreclosed. Stanard
may be distinguished on two grounds. First, breach of promise is based on contract
while alienation of affections sounds in tort. Second, the purpose behind the breach of
promise action, compensation for an unfulfilled contract, may be achieved to a great-
er extent than the purposes behind the alienation of affections cause of action, which
are deterring "home wreckers" and compensating for loss of the marital companion.
See H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 10.2, at 267 (1968).
43. Many anti-heartbalm statutes attack collectively breach of promise to marry.
alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction. See, e.g., CAL. CiV.
CODE § 43.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1975-1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West Cum.
Supp. 1976); N.Y. CiV. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney 1976).
44. Legislative abolition of breach of promise to marry actions has an advantage
over judicial abolition because it permits integration of legislative domestic relations
policies instead of case-by-case development. Despite challenges based upon depriva-
tion of a legal remedy, the constitutionality of anti-heartbalm legislation in general
has been upheld. See, e.g.. Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d 815, appeal
dismissed, 301 U.S. 667 (1936); 52 COL. L. REV. 242, 243-45 (1952). Contra, Heck




should take into account the interests of both parties. Gifts between
engaged persons and expenses in anticipation of marriage are poten-
tially troublesome, because abolition of breach of promise suits
should not inadvertently condone the unjust enrichment of one party.
A damage suit for fraud would circumvent the purpose of an anti-
heartbalm statute by allowing essentially the same cause of action un-
der a different name.45 Permitting a quasi-contractual suit seeking
restitution, however, would be statutorily consistent and prevent un-
just enrichment. 46
The return of engagement gifts has generally been restricted to situ-
ations in which the gifts were conditioned on the performance of mar-
riage47 and were given by the nonbreaching party. 48 Many courts
have narrowly construed the category of "gifts made in anticipation of
45. Disallowing suits on fraudulent promise to marry under anti-heartbalm statutes
is the better and majority view. If such tort suits were allowed, the coercive potential
would remain even though the strict elements of fraud must be proven. See, e.g., A.B.
v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd per curiam, 123 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941); Thibault v. Lalumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d
349 (1945); Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1938); 70
HARv. L. REV. 1098, 1099 (1957); 9 STAN. L. REV. 406, 409 (1957). Contra, Langley
v. Schumacker, 46 Cal. 2d 601, 297 P.2d 977 (1956). The California legislature abol-
ished actions based on fraudulent promises to marry in 1959. CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.4
(West Cum. Supp. 1978). See also 18 U. PITT. L. REv. 667, 670 (1957) (barring ac-
tions for fraud under an anti-heartbalm statute "would protect fraud as serious as that
which it was enacted to prevent").
46. See Gikas v. Nicholis, 96 N.E. 177, 71 A.2d 785 (1950); 3 VILL. L. REV. 387,
390-91 (1958). Early decisions by the Massachusetts and New York courts forbade
any suit remotely resembling a breach of promise action. Thibault v. Lalumiere, 318
Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945); Andie v. Kaplan, 263 App. Div. 884, 32 N.Y.S.2d
429, aff'd per curiam, 288 N.Y. 685, 43 N.E.2d 82 (1942) (action to recover money
and jewelry given in anticipation of marriage). The Massachusetts court abandoned
its extremist position in 1959. De Cicco v. Barker, 339 Mass. 457, 159 N.E.2d 534
(1959). The New York legislature abrogated its position in 1965. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 80-b (McKinney 1976). See Goldstein v. Rosenthal, 56 Misc. 2d 311, 288
N.Y.S. 2d 503 (1968).
47. Gikas v. Nicholis, 96 N.H. 117, 71 A.2d 785 (1950) (the policy of unjust
enrichment allowed the return of a ring given under the implied condition that mar-
riage would follow, but other gifts were characterized as incidental to the marital re-
quest and hence not recoverable); Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 390 Pa. 502, 136 A.2d 127
(1957).
48. Beberman v. Segal, 6 NJ. Super. 472, 69 A.2d 587 (1949). For a lengthy
listing of other cases, see Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 578, at § 3 (1972). This qualification is
made in jurisdictions with and without anti-heartbalm statutes. Id. Contra, Gaden v.
Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80, 272 N.E.2d 471, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1971) (fault irrelevant in
restitution of gifts). Great Britain has abolished breach of promise as a cause of ac-
tion and dispensed with consideration of fault in recovery of conditional gifts. Engage-
ment rings are placed in the separate category of absolute gifts, however, "so as to
preserve the right of the wronged woman to throw the ring into the river rather than
return it to her former fianc6." 33 MOD. L. REV. 534,.536 (1970).
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marriage" to limit recovery to engagement rings, a result which fails
fully to prevent unjust enrichment. 4"9 A preferable approach, followed
in New York, recognizes a rebuttable but "strong presumption of law
that any gifts made during an engagement period are given solely in
consideration of marriage, and are recoverable if the marriage does
not materialize."5 0 The purposes of restitution and the avoidance of
publicizing private matters are also defeated by conditioning the re-
turn of gifts upon a determination of fault.51
Upon failure of an engagement, expenses in preparation for mar-
riage have customarily fallen on the woman. An extension of no-fault
and quasi-contractual principles to this area would treat the couple as
a partnership, equally bearing the economic burden of their unsuc-
cessful endeavor.5 2 In allocating the expense of aborted wedding
plans, gifts given during the engagement period between the parties
49. See, e.g., Gikas v. Nicholis, 96 N.H. 177, 71 A.2d 785 (1950).
50. Friedman v. Geller, 368 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975). The pre-
sumption is based on N.Y. Cv. RIGHTS LAW § 80-b (McKinney 1976), which states
that the statutory abolition of breach of promise suits should not be construed to bar
a cause of action for the recovery of a gift given in contemplation of marriage. The
Friedman court granted summary judgment for the return of a ring and joint banking
deposit to avoid turning the courtroom into a "grotesque marketplace" of private
matters which the anti-heartbalm statute sought to end. 368 N.Y.S.2d at 983. The
presumption of recovery is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 982.
Gifts between engaged parties, however, are not reclaimable upon termination of
an engagement when both parties were aware at the time of engagement that one of
them was married. Adams v. Jensen-Thomas, 18 Wn. App. 757, 571 P.2d 958 (1977).
This common law rule remains sound. Such gifts could not be conditioned on the
parties' future marriage, because such contracts would be in "violation of the [pre-
existing] marital duty and are contrary to morality and public policy." Id. at 761.
571 P.2d at 960 (citing with approval Jones v. Allen, 14 Wn. 2d 111. 119, 127 P.2d
265, 269 (1942).
51. In addressing the application of N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80-b (McKinney
1976) (gifts made in contemplation of marriage), the New York courts embarked
on a desirable path:
To require a determination of fault in order to entitle one to recover engagement
gifts would simply condone [breach of promise to marry as a cause of action] in
yet another form ...
. . . Just as the question of fault or guilt has become largely irrelevant to mod-
ern divorce proceedings ... so should it also be deemed irrelevant to the break-
ing of the engagement.
Gaden v. Gaden. 29 N.Y.2d 80, 88, 272 N.E.2d 471, 476, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955. 962
(1971). Prior to the promulgation of the statute in 1965, New York courts had re-
fused to acknowledge any action even incidentally related to breach of promise. See
note 46 supra.
52. If parties mutually benefit from the engagement period, the allocation of ex-
penses in a recovery should be equal. As in the restitution of gifts, fault should not




could be claimed as a setoff, provided that the arrangement is mutally
agreeable. 53
Protecting a partner from nonpecuniary injuries resulting from a
wedding cancellation, such as humiliation and embarrassment, may
be an area in which compensation is not socially desirable. In the
realm of personal relationships such as marriage and engagement, it
seems preferable to dispense with legal intervention and to allow so-
cial customs and values to control the accepted norms of conduct.54
IV. CONCLUSION
The Stanard court, in its commitment to compensate an aggrieved
plaintiff, resurrected a little-used, archaic cause of action. The court's
modification of recoverable damages removed one onerous aspect of
breach of promise suits, but other problems remain. Legislative aboli-
tion offers the best solution. Such legislation, however, should expli-
citly preserve quasi-contractual remedies to ensure protection of
reliance on marital promises, to secure restitution of gifts given during
an engagement, and to provide an equitable division of wedding ex-
penses.
D. Joseph Hurson
53. Requiring an agreement would prevent a donee from retaining a donor's
family heirloom given during engagement by claiming it as a setoff against wedding
expenses. Imposing an undesired gift upon the donee as a setoff measure would also
be avoided.
54. The Marriage Dissolution Act shows a preference toward private solutions.
See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra. The termination of an engagement is
not so different that it should require state intrusion to regulate conduct.
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